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Introduction
The Rehoboth Gebiet, "homeland" of the Baster people of Namibia,
covers an area of about 1.3 million hectares, or three million
acres. Located slightly south on the central plateau, it has
often been described as including some of the best farming land in
the territory. The northern parts are regarded as being prime
pasturage for large stock, while the drier and more sandy southern
reaches are generally considered to be very good country for the
raising of karakul, sheep and goats. But even the casual observer
is struck by the fact that the land is poorly and unevenly
utilized for farming purposes. Although there are a few farms
where installations and livestock would compare very favourably
with some of the better ones in the surrounding white areas, this
is far from common. Many Baster-owned farms are clearly
overcrowded, and unable to support through farming the large
numbers of people settled on them. They are rural slums, where
the only evidence of farming will be a few goats cropping the odd
tuft of vegetation amid the many poorly-constructed corrugated-
iron shacks. On other farms there may be good grazing, but few of
the other necessities required to pursue modern farming methods:
the quality of the livestock may be poor, and there may be a
shortage of bore-holes and other installations required for
efficient exploitation of the resources. Still other Baster-owned
farms consist largely of pangrond: land almost devoid of
vegetation, where the surface of the earth has been trampled into
a hard crust through overstocking and drought.
In an earlier period, however, farming in the area had prospered.
Some grain crops, and even fruit and vegetables, were raised, on
both dryland fields and riparian plots - albeit with mixed
success. It was, however, in the raising of livestock that the
Baster community really excelled. For more than the first decade
of German rule in the territory, transportation depended almost
entirely on oxen bred from the "superior (Cape) colonial breed" of
cattle in the Baster Gebiet. (1) The Schutztruppe also relied, in
part, on remounts supplied by Baster breeders from the Gebiet, (2)
and a Baster farmer won prizes for horses, cattle, and sheep
against stiff competition from German settlers at the Windhoek
show in 1902. (3)
Relative prosperity appears to have continued during the German
Colonial period, despite the fact that the community lost vast
tracts of land (and most of its political independence) under the
regime. Likewise, in the early period of South African rule
Baster farmers were reported to be "in good circumstances" because
of the high prices that they were receiving for slaughter stock
exported to the Union markets. (4)
In this paper I attempt to provide a brief outline of the
historical conditions and customary practises which have led to
the decline in the farming potential of the Gebiet, and secondly
to describe the state's development initiative, and the political
and economic consequences of this intervention.
Drought and Depression in the Baster Gebiet
In an earlier paper I have described some of the effects on the
Baster community of a depression which struck in 1921. (5) The
value of slaughter stock was to fall to 20 per cent of prices
fetched two years earlier, and Baster farming began a severe
decline from which it would not quickly recover.
The early 1920s also saw the majority of Basters embark on a
campaign of defiance against the South African authorities over an
agreement signed by the Baster Council in 1923. The agreement
had failed to secure the return of land lost under the German
regime, and also limited Baster political independence. Faced by
a rebellion which threatened to spread to other parts of the
territory, the administration attempted to bring the Baster
community to heel by preventing the export of both firewood and
livestock from the Gebiet. Although this had very severe local
economic consequences, it proved inadequate as a means of ending
the rebellion, apparently because many of the Basters were
subsisting from renting grazing land to landless Herero
pastoralists. The rebellion was eventually put down by force, and
the Hereros were removed to other reserve areas, but for seven
years the rebels stood firm in their refusal to collaborate with
the state. Their resistance eventually crumbled in the face of
drought and the Great Depression.
In his report to the League of Nations for the year 1928, the
Administrator for South West Africa noted that "a somewhat severe
drought" and exceptional heat had occurred in the second half of
the year. (6) These conditions were to persist until 1934, when
extensive floods broke what had been the worst drought in the
territory in living memory. (7) The combination of drought and
depression was to have disastrous effects on the country as a
whole, and on the Baster Gebiet in particular.
Farmers lost up to 70 per cent of their livestock,(8) and what
remained was naturally of very poor quality. In contrast to the
situation in Namibia, the Union, which was virtually the only
export market for the territory, had generally good rainfalls - at
least up until 1930. Namibian slaughter stock, being of inferior
quality in an already oversupplied market, was therefore
unsaleable. (9)
In response to these conditions the state initiated a number of
relief measures. Ten districts in the territory, including
Rehoboth District, were declared drought-stricken, and farmers who
resided within them became eligible for various forms of state-
subsidised drought relief. (10) The state assistance took the
form of the lowering of rail tariffs on stock and stock feed, and
the granting of credit on railage costs. The repayment of loans
to the Land Bank, as well as the interest on such loans, was
deferred. (11)
It is possible that the Basters were the group which was most
severely affected by this devastating combination of drought and
depression. They were probably more deeply involved in the money
economy than were any other indigenous groups, and consequently
their inability to sell stock was disastrous in a community which
was, in any case, always chronically short of ready cash. (12)
But despite the fact that the farmers of the Rehoboth District
were eligible for state assistance, Baster farmers actually
received virtually nothing to ameliorate their situation. Unable
to afford the cost of supplementary feed, the Basters resorted to
pulling down the enormous nests of the sociable weavers to feed
their livestock. Reduced rail tariffs on animal feed were
worthless to them. The poor condition of their stock, and its
consequent unsaleability in the flooded export market made the
concessions on its transport equally worthless. Similarly, the
deferment on the repayments of loans, and interest on loans,
granted by the Land Bank were irrelevant, since the Basters, as
"non-whites", had never been granted such loans. (12a)
But while the Basters did not benefit from loans from the Land
Bank, local shopkeepers provided an alternative source of credit,
and the community soon fell deeply into debt to these traders.
Debts of £80 to £100 were common, while it was estimated that only
about 10 per cent of the community was in a position to meet their
debts (13) which were calculated to be of the order of £20,000 by
April 1932. (14)
Even Niklaas Olivier, a member of the Advisory Council, and
regarded as being one of the wealthiest men in the Gebiet, was
summonsed for debts totalling £85 in 1932. (15) The merchants, it
was said, had had numerous debtors jailed "through hunger".
In a letter to the Administrator in September 1930, members of the
community complained about the apparent lack of concern by the
authorities for their plight. They noted that jobs in the postal
services and road works in the Gebiet were in the hands of whites,
while no employment was provided by the state for Basters; that
ostriches in the Gebiet had been virtually exterminated as a
consequence of hunting by police and other white residents, while
the ammunition issued to those few Basters who had retained their
weapons after the rebellion was severely restricted; that the
Basters were not receiving any assistance comparable to that which
whites in the territory were receiving. "Waarlik ..." they noted,
"... ons is en god vergetene volk." (16)
The Administration responded by initiating relief work repairing
roads in the Gebiet. The rate was 3/6 per working day (7 am to
6.30 pm) . Half of the cost was borne by the Administration; the
other half was was drawn from the Baster Community Fund. No
rations were provided. (17) Over 200 Basters took up the offer.
Pauper's rations were also provided for women and those men too
old or unfit to work. The paupers' list numbered 82 by June of
1932. (18) Since poverty-stricken members of the rebel group
generally attempted to avoid all state aid, and apparently tended
to rely on the irregular and inadequate support of their co-
rebels, this figure does not reflect the true extent of the
desperate hardship in the Gebiet. People were, according to the
Administrator, "literally dying of hunger" as early as November
1930. (19)
With their herds of livestock depleted by the drought, and in any
case unsaleable, and all but abandoned by an uncaring state, the
Basters had only one resource left: their grazing lands.
The Hiring of Grazing Lands
In the early part of 1931, good rains fell in the Gebiet, while
surrounding areas remained in the grip of the drought. (20) What
at first appeared to the Basters to be a heaven-sent relief from
their plight was to lead to the near-destruction of the Gebiet's
farming economy. The rains temporarily improved pasture within
the Gebiet, while the situation remained desperate in other
districts. Soon, the Advisory Council was faced with a flood of
applications from white farmers who wanted to hire grazing within
the area.
Given the fact that it was the policy of the Administration to
assist these farmers, and the fact that the Basters were under
increasing pressure from their creditors, it is not surprising
that the suggestion that Gebiet pasture be hired out was
favourably received in both Windhoek and Rehoboth. At first only
applications of farmers who lived within Rehoboth District (of
which the Gebiet was a part) were considered, (21) but soon
applications from all farmers, including those in districts
further afield, were favourably considered. (22)
There was a certain amount of opposition to the hiring of grazing
from particular individuals within the Gebiet. Some felt that
only Basters should be permitted to hire Baster land, but this was
opposed by others, who noted that there was virtually no demand
for grazing from within the Gebiet. In any case, one Baster
farmer claimed that when he had hired his farm to another Baster
the profit had been insufficient to cover even the tax on the
farm. The hirers were unable to meet the payments, and he could
not easily sue them for the arrears. Whites would probably be
better able to meet the hiring fees, he believed. (23)
One of the main reasons why opposition to the hiring of grazing
could not be sustained - apart from the fact that many Basters had
no other recourse in their straitened circumstances - was that the
land was privately owned. Unlike other reserve areas where land
was communally held, Baster land had been privatized as early as
1890. The Council had granted title to farms 7,000 morgen in
extent to ordinary Burgers, and tracts of 10,000 morgen to its own
members. (24) Although it was regarded as totally immoral to
refuse grazing or water on your farm to anyone in need, there was
nonetheless a strong feeling about the independence of the
individual farm owner (captured, perhaps, in the use of the term
"plaasbaas" to describe a farm owner) and his right to make
decisions about the use of his land. According to the deeds the
Captain and Council had the final say on the sale of the produce
of individually owned land holdings, (25) but since both the
Magistrate (who now held the title of Captain by virtue of
Proclamation No. 31 of 1924) as well as the members of his
Advisory Council were in favour of hiring, they readily consented
to Baster land-owners entering into grazing contracts with white
farmers.
Grazing permits which were valid for three to four months were
issued to farmers from outside the Gebiet. These permits were
later extended to six months, and it was intended that they could
be regularly renewed for as long as the drought persisted. The
grazier could either rent a farm (or a portion of one), or he
could pay fees according to the number of head of livestock which
he intended to graze on the farm. The rate for a farm varied from
£1 to £2 10/- per month, according to the size of the farm, the
quality of the veld, the availability of water, and the
improvements such as bore-holes and buildings which the grazier
might offer to effect. If he elected to hire according to the
number of head he intended to graze, the rate was usually 6d per
head of large stock or 5/- per 100 small stock per month. (26)
Limits on the maximum number of stock to be grazed were set in the
contract, but oral testimony indicates that these were often
greatly exceeded, and that the farms were drastically overstocked
because of the dire financial straits of the farm owners. If the
Council queried the number of stock being grazed on a particular
farm, the Baster landowner would simply claim the excess number as
belonging to his own flock or herd. Even where limits set in the
contract were adhered to - and these appear to have been in the
minority of cases - the number of stock which the contract allowed
to be grazed on the land was often very high. Sometimes 800 head
of small stock were permitted on a farm of 3,500 hectares, making
an average of 4.4 hectares per head. This did not include stock
which was owned by the landowner, and was grazed alongside the
stock of the grazier. A recent study suggests that the stock-
carrying capacity of average farming land in the Gebiet today is
3.5 hectares per head of small stock in non-drought conditions,
(27) which leaves a margin of 0.9 Ha per head. But this certainly
was a time of drought, and in any case, today's ratio is not
really comparable with that of the early 1930s, when fencing and
the camp system were not used by the Basters, and when there was
an almost total reliance on wells as a source of water: bore-holes
and windmills being beyond the means of all but the very rich.
The good later rains of 1931, predicted after the early fall in
that year, failed to materialize, but despite this the graziers
and their flocks remained, since conditions outside of the Gebiet
remained even more dire than did those within it. Indeed, their
numbers grew as an ever-increasing number of Basters and white
farmers came to see renting of pasture in the Gebiet as their only
salvation. Unfortunately the official figures for the number of
stock introduced into the Gebiet in this period are imprecise, but
the indications are that it was considerable. In the twelve month
period between May 1933 and April 1934 alone, 50,000 head of
small stock and an unknown number of large stock were allowed into
the Gebiet under the grazing licence system. (28) Eventually the
Council decided that the stock in the Gebiet was in excess of the
carrying capacity of the land, and it was resolved that no further
applications for grazing be considered. (29) This resolution was
not strictly adhered to, however, and applications from
"Coloureds" evicted from white farms to the south of the Gebiet,
where they had previously been living as tenants, received
favourable consideration from the Council. (30) Unlike the
whites, who never gained the right to settle in the Gebiet
permanently, these "Coloureds" could, after a period of residence,
apply for citizenship of the Gebiet. The new immigrants were
consequently to put further strain on the farming resources of the
Gebiet in the long term.
The Voss and Scott Commission, and the Leasing of Baster Farms
In January of 1930, a Commission of Enquiry whose members were G.
du T. Voss, Attorney General of the territory, and H.G. Scott,
Magistrate of Grootfontein, was appointed to enquire into the
system of land tenure practiced in the Gebiet. The terms of
reference of the Commission reveal the quite remarkable degree of
ignorance of the authorities in Windhoek about the situation in
the Gebiet. It was required to investigate, inter alia, the
system of land-ownership in the Gebiet (which was presumed to be
communal), and to report on "what steps should be taken to
introduce into the Gebiet a system of land tenure under which land
will be owned by individuals." It was also required that the
Commissioners recommend a means whereby financial assistance could
be offered to the community: possibly through the Land Bank. (31)
The only significant findings of the Commission were that the
farms in the Gebiet had never been properly surveyed, that
boundaries between farms were consequently ill-defined, and that
the land register was inaccurate and inadequate in several
respects. It was therefore recommended that a proper survey of
the Gebiet be carried out, and that the results be recorded in a
more efficient manner. (32) The opposition of Baster witnesses to
these recommendations caused the Commissioners some dismay.
Almost all of the witnesses were adamant that the surveying of
their farms was undesirable. The alienation of land to people who
were not members of the community had always been accompanied by a
survey. "Plaas meet is grond vervreem ..." (33) they asserted.
The Commissioners concluded that the two events had become
associated and confused in the Basters1 minds, and that opposition
on these grounds, while understandable, was illogical. In fact,
the two things were associated in more than just their minds,
since the alienation of more land than had been sold was the
common - and pernicious - accompaniment of those previous land
surveys which had determined boundaries between white- and Baster-
owned farms, both within, and bordering on, the Gebiet. Evidence
given to earlier boundary commissions attests to the extent of
this encroachment of white farmers onto Baster land. The question
of what would happen to land lying unoccupied between Baster-owned
farms once the proposed survey had been completed also loomed
large in the minds of the witnesses, who were well aware that the
1923 Agreement between the Basters and the Union Government gave
them rights only to those lands which they actually occupied. (34)
They feared that if land to which no Baster held title were to
come to light as a consequence of the survey, such land might be
deemed to be the possession of the Administration rather than of
the Baster community.
Another objection raised against the proposed survey was that it
would lead to enmity between neighbours - an assertion which the
Commission found difficult to understand, believing that "...
disputes are far more likely to arise from uncertainty as to
boundaries than from certainty." (35) This view failed to take
account of the moral idea of vrye woning, in terms of which it was
acknowledged that any member of the community had a moral claim to
access to water and grazing on any Baster farm if he was in need -
despite the existence of private ownership. It was feared that
the absolute demarcation of boundaries between farms would lead to
registered owners becoming more possessive of their land and,
consequently, increasingly inhospitable. (36)
The most important objection against the survey was, however, that
it would be very expensive (about £35 per farm) (37) and that the
Basters were far too poor to pay the charges. The Commissioners
countered this objection by recommending that the Land Bank
advance the money, using the farm to be surveyed as surety against
the debt. But to this proposal the majority of the witnesses were
vehemently opposed, since they feared that it could lead to the
expropriation of Baster land.
Because of the opposition to the scheme, the matter appears to
have been left in abeyance. As long as the drought continued,
there was a plentiful supply of white farmers wanting to hire
pasture on short term contracts, and the Basters were content with
the system. The short-term hiring of pasture soon began to create
difficulties, however. With the end of the drought the number of
would-be hirers dwindled, and long-term leasing came to be seen as
a desirable alternative to the grazing licence system. (38)
The Leasing System
The leasing system was introduced in 1938. Leases initially ran
for a period of one year, but when this proved to be inadequate,
they were replaced with leases lasting a minimum of two years.
The leasing arrangement was attractive to Baster landowners for a
number of reasons, the most important being that the income from
the lease was greater than the cost of the survey, and the balance
was paid to the landowner. Having become dependent on the income
earned from hiring out pasture during the drought, there appeared
to be little alternative to these landowners but to continue such
dependence. A landowner could also often obtain employment from
the white lessee, and could thus secure additional income without
having to leave his farm. (39)
Leasing was also attractive to the white lessee. By 1939
practically all Crown Land in Namibia deemed suitable for white
settlers had been allocated, and the acquisition of temporary
access to Baster-owned land in Rehoboth was one of the few ways in
which whites could build up a farming business before buying or
leasing more expensive land in the white areas. (40) Established
farmers were also attracted to the system, since in times of
drought they could use the alternative facilities offered in the
Gebiet. Very often they stayed on long after the drought had
passed, and their stock grew in numbers on Baster-owned land. The
most complete statistics of the leasing system are for the end of
1943. At that time at least 64 contracts were still in operation,
and a minimum of 8,392 head of large stock and 71,188 head of
small stock owned by whites were being grazed in the Gebiet. (41)
It was argued that this massive influx of white-owned stock
benefited the Baster community. Not only was cash more readily
available, but the white farmers also brought about improvements
to the farms, particularly through providing water by drilling
bore-holes, and also by building new dwellings. But the
Magistrate at Rehoboth had doubts about these supposedly positive
effects, and set out these doubts in a letter to the Administrator
in 1942. He pointed out that however desirable the surveying of
farms might be, the owners themselves obtained minimal, if any,
material advantage from the system. He observed that the stock of
the Baster owners had deteriorated, since lessees demanded the
best pasture and water for their own stock, even in those cases
where they did permit the owner to graze his stock on the land
they had leased. The so-called improvements were also of dubious
advantage to the owners. A well-built three-roomed house might
make for comfort, but did little to assist the Baster farmer in
rebuilding his farming business. Where bore-holes were drilled,
they often meant little to the farm owner once the lessee had
left. The majority of owners were too poor to buy pumps or
windmills to draw the water, and consequently derived no benefit.
Nor could much be shown for the cash payments which the owners
received. They often covered only the subsistence needs of the
lessor's family, and were thus not used to increase the capital of
the farm. Only one wealthy man had used the money acquired from
leasing his farm to fence it after it had been surveyed. (4 2)
In order to ensure that the Baster landowner derived some benefit
other than the dubious one of knowing precisely where the
boundaries of his farm lay, the Magistrate recommended that the
land be leased for a further term, even where the survey costs had
been met, and that the rental be used exclusively for the
provision of pumps for bore-holes or for the purchase of breeding
stock. These suggestions were implemented in a modified form,
(43) and consequently some Baster farmers were able to rebuild
their depleted flocks. But the scale of leasing began to drop
significantly in precisely this period, and the needs of white
farmers were met, instead, by reverting to the grazing licence
system during periods of drought.
Racial Ideology and the End of the Leasing System
Apart from the fact that white farming began to be established on
a rather firmer footing in this period, there were also important
ideological reasons for the Administration wanting to bring the
leasing system to an end. One of these was that white farmers
were becoming firmly ensconced in the Gebiet. Despite the fact
that leases and grazing licences were supposed to be granted only
t o
 bona fide farmers, the regulations were not strictly observed,
and whenever the droughts ended there were always some farmers who
could not be persuaded to leave the Gebiet, simply because they
had nowhere else to go. Some had even established trading stores
in the Gebiet, and the Magistrate was reluctant to resort to what
he saw as the extreme expedient of withdrawing their trading
licences in order to force them to leave. (44) So firmly
established did the white inhabitants of the Gebiet become that by
1955 they were agitating for the proclamation of a separate white
town in Rehoboth. (45) The Administration had declared itself to
be in favour of a regional separation of whites and "non-whites"
at least 30 years earlier, (46) and the leasing and grazing
licence systems now came to be seen to be operating in direct
contradiction to this policy.
Apart from the general offence against the principle of separation
of the races, the grazing and leasing systems also inverted the
normal class positions of those involved. In a situation where
colour and class were so closely intertwined, it was considered
inappropriate to have a white tenant dependent on a "non-white"
landowner. Baster farmers were seen as deriving benefits in the
form of improvements to their farms - benefits which they did not
"deserve". They were perceived to be "living off the white man".
The Secretary for the territory noted that "... hulle wil die
groot base wees en die witman moet werk." (4 7) In the same vein
the Administrator told a Baster Council delegation: "Ons wil nie
he dat julle oor die standpunt neem dat julle is hier groot
menere en op die stoep sit met die pyp, en die Boer vir julle
julle plase laat bewerk." (48)
But despite the fact that the verandah and the pipe were deemed to
be the white man's prerogative, the system was to continue
intermittently for as long as white farmers needed to exploit the
reserve pasture which the Gebiet had to offer, and it was only in
the 1960s, when the white farming sector was on a completely sound
footing, that the system was outlawed. It continued to a small
extent even after this, albeit in a clandestine fashion. (49)
Today many Baster farmers claim that it was only those few who
were able to resist the temptation to lease their farms, who
retain viable farming enterprises. This is an overstatement:
there were a few farmers who did manage to re-establish their
farms through leasing them. But in the main it is true that the
hiring out of farms, and the over-stocking which resulted, did
severe damage to the Gebiet's pasturage.
Apartheid and (Separate) Development
After the Second World War South Africa came under increasingly
intensified pressure from the United Nations Organization over its
administration of Namibia, It would be inappropriate to examine
the nature of this dispute in any detail here, but it is important
to note that in the face of this pressure the South African
Government began to bring about important changes to the
administrative structure in the territory. (50)
The instrument used to formulate these changes was the Odendaal
Commission which was appointed in September 1962. (51) Both its
composition (Odendaal was a leading Nationalist, and Administrator
of the Transvaal) (52) and the narrowness of its terms of
reference ensured that the recommendations of the Commission would
be in line with Government thinking of the time. (53) The
Commission took fifteen months to arrive at a blue-print for the
implementation of Apartheid in the territory. (54)
The Commission recommended that the country was to be divided into
white farmlands and "homelands" for the "non-white" groups, and
each of these groups was to progress independently along the path
to "self-determination". Concrete proposals for the establishment
of development projects within the homelands were to be left to
the Department of Bantu Administration, or one or other of the
State development corporations. (55)
Of all the proposed homelands to be established in the territory,
the Rehoboth Gebiet was probably the most advantaged. Unlike some
others, the Baster homeland had no areas classified as desert, it
was favoured with better-than-average rainfall, and a much smaller
than average ratio of population to land than many other
"homeland" areas. It is also in close proximity to the markets of
Windhoek - the commercial centre of the territory - and has a
choice between road and rail transport for its produce. Given
these advantages, the Commissioners believed that Rehoboth could
be developed into a "model homeland": a showpiece of Separate
Development. It was, they argued, because the Basters had lived
by leasing their farms to whites rather than engaging in "honest
labour" that the Gebiet presented the sorry picture that it did.
(56)
The task of making concrete proposals to provide alternatives to
the leasing of farms in the Gebiet was left to a committee
established in February 1967 under the chairmanship of A.H. du
Plessis, a member of the South West African Legislative Assembly.
Its brief was to investigate methods of developing the Gebiet.
(57) The other members of the Committee included the Magistrate
of the district (in his capacity as Captain of the Baster
community) , and three members of the Baster Advisory Council. Two
of these were to withdraw from the Committee before it could draw
up its report because they were opposed to the idea that capital
for the development of the Gebiet should be made available to
members of the community in the form of loans. They feared that
this would lead to the alienation of Baster-owned land, and were
of the opinion that any assistance which was to be given should
take the form of donations made by the State. (5 8)
The Committee found that the lack of adequate capital for the
Gebiet was a major reason why the Rehoboth Gebiet was, in 1968,
producing between one-third and one-fifth of its potential had it
been a white farming area. (59) An additional major stumbling
block was the proliferation of numerous land holdings of sizes
which were far less than the minimum economic unit. This had come
about because of the traditional system of inheritance, through
which the land had been drastically subdivided. (60)
In order to illustrate the extent of this subdivision, the
Committee produced the following table which shows the pattern of
ownership of the 346 surveyed and registered farms in the Gebiet:
in 1968.
Table 1: Ownership of Farmland (1968) (61)









Totals = 2,244 346
The table shows the deleterious effects of the system of
inheritance. Almost two thirds of the farms had more than one
owner, while one farm had 7 2 owners. But the table does not show
the full extent of the problem. Of the 126 farms which had only a
single owner, only 81 consisted of more than 1,500 hectares -
which the Committee took to be an economic unit. Of the farms
with between two and four owners, a further 24 were of an economic
size, making the total number of such farms 105, owned by 141
individuals. In other words, a bare six percent of all farm
owners in the Gebiet were farming tracts of land of an
economically viable size.
The traditional system of inheritance had also contributed to the
scale of the leasing of Baster land, since it was simpler and more
economical to lease an inherited farm in its undivided state, with
all heirs benefiting from a portion of the leasing fee, than to go
through the expense of a land survey and subdivision, and then be
left with a multitude of economically unviable plots.
We turn now to a more detailed examination of the traditional
inheritance system. We will also consider briefly some cases
studies of subdivision, and then examine some of the traditional
mechanisms through which the subdivision of land was avoided, or
through which subdivided land was reconsolidated.
The Inheritance of Land in the Baster Gebiet
The traditional system of inheritance practised by the Rehoboth
Baster community apparently has its roots in Roman-Dutch law. It
is a partible system which does not discriminate on grounds of sex
or order of birth. On the death of a spouse, the estate of the
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deceased is divided between the heirs. It is first divided in
half, with one half devolving on the relict spouse. The other
half is divided into a number of equal portions: one for each
child of the marriage, plus one. The additional portion is then
added to the half devolving on the relict spouse. An example in
which there are four children who are to inherit from an estate







Figure 1: Subdivision at Inheritance
When the relict spouse dies his or her share is divided equally
between the children. If the relict spouse remarries before he or
she dies, the rules of inheritance become decidedly uncertain,
however. Some informants claim that a woman loses all rights to
the property; others say that the sex of the inheritor is of no
consequence, and that, once inherited, the property is retained if
the person remarries. Most informants insist that if the
situation was to be all that complicated, there would certainly be
a written will! One might note, however, that if this is not the
case, a good measure of intra-family conflict might well be an
unintended part of the patrimony.
The pattern of the division of the estate which I have described
above was the one always recounted to me as the traditional form
of inheritance, but in practice the situation is often very
different. It is actually quite rare for the farm to be subdivided
on the death of one partner in the marriage. I came across only
one case in which land devolved on the children of a marriage
prior to the death of a relict spouse. Even here, the family farm
was not subdivided. Instead, the children of the marriage
inherited a piece of land which the relict spouse had bought from
a neighbouring farmer. In all other cases investigated the farms
remained undivided until the death of the relict spouse. Although
moveable property was divided between the heirs according to the
traditional formula, the land continued to be utilized as a unit,
with all the children of the marriage - and their surviving
parent - having rights to its use. When I questioned the children
who were heirs to such farms as to the reason for the subdivision
not having taken place, they invariably replied that this was
because the cost of a land survey was very high. Instead of
dividing the land immediately, they said, it was better to wait a
while. This I took to mean that it was better to wait until their
surviving parent had died before employing a surveyor to divide
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the farm, thus saving half of the cost of having it done twice. I
was also told that such a division was unnecessary while the
children were getting on well with one another: if any one of them
became dissatisfied, it might have to be done; until then, it
could be put off. The division of an estate often generates
disagreement among heirs, and the most common of these arises over
the division of land. By putting off the division of the farm
until after the death of their parent, the children were sparing
him or her the animosity which might arise. When I put the
question of why the division had not taken place to the relict
spouse, he or she would always cite the cost of the survey as a
reason, and add that, in any case, the children did not want it to
take place as yet.
One should note that the decision of whether or not to follow the
traditional formula for the devolution of land is directly
influenced by the age of the surviving spouse. In the case cited
above where land did devolve on the children of the marriage
before their father had died, this took place shortly before he
remarried. In other cases investigated the ages of the surviving
spouses made it most unlikely that they would marry again. It
would seem, therefore, that following the traditional formula of
inheritance in respect of land is appropriate only where the
family, too, is likely to be divided between siblings and step-
siblings. The portion of the farm inherited by the relict spouse
would then enable him or her to provide for the support of a
second family which might be established.
To illustrate the effects of the system of inheritance on farm
sizes, one may briefly cite the following case studies:
1. Olifantspan. (6 2) This farm lies in the south-western
portion of the Gebiet. The owner of this farm, which is 10,000
hectares in extent, died in 1974. Although his wife had
predeceased him two years before, no subdivision took place until
after his death. Each of his surviving seven children inherited
1,000 hectares, which is about half of what is considered to be an
economic unit in this part of the Gebiet. The other three
children had predeceased their father, leaving a total of 19
children between them. These children inherited between 20 0 and
111 hectares each: between a fifth and a tenth of an economic
unit.
2. Bloupoort: This is a 7,000 hectare farm in the north-
eastern part of the Gebiet. When the owner died in 1972, there
were so many heirs to the property that it was decided that rather
than subdivide the farm it should be sold as a whole, and the
proceeds of the sale divided between the heirs. Some heirs
received as little as R24 as an inheritance.
3. This case was cited in a report published in 1981, (63)
where no name of the farm (or portion of the farm) was given. It
concerned the case of a man who had inherited a landholding some
250 hectares in extent. He had decided that on his death, his 15
children would inherit the property as a joint estate. The
children had already built houses on the property, and lived there
whenever they returned on leave from their places of work.
From these examples one can see that if the rule of partibility
had been rigorously applied, without attempts being made to
reconsolidate subdivided land, the number of sub-economic plots in
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the Gebiet would be even greater than it it actually is. In fact,
there are a number of common practices which serve to reduce the
rate of subdivision. This is not to suggest that these practices
are particularly effective: on the contrary, the figures in Table
1 prove that they are dismally inadequate. Nevertheless, they
must be mentioned, if only in order to account for the fact that
subdivision has not proceeded with the relentless geometric
progression that it might have. (64)
The first method is simply to run the farm as a communally
utilized unit. It has already been mentioned that this is very
common where the age of the relict spouse is such that a second
marriage is unlikely. Sometimes, however, the farm continues to
be kept as a unit by the children even after the death of the
surviving parent. All of the children are then responsible for
contributing to the annual land tax, and all are entitled to keep
stock on the farm and to reside on it. This strategy is most
commonly the one pursued by the poorest people, who cannot afford
the cost of a land survey, or, where there is a particularly large
group of heirs: the two conditions often being coterminous. The
success of this strategy obviously depends largely on the degree
of cooperation which can be maintained between the heirs.
An alternative but closely related strategy is involves informal
subdivision. Here the heirs decide among themselves where the
boundaries of their particular portions of land lie, demarcate
them, and perhaps even fence them off, but do not institute a
formal survey, or register the portions in their own names. This
system is most commonly used where the heirs are poor, but
relatively few in number. Naturally, it does not serve to
reconsolidate land: perhaps its only real effect is to conceal the
real extent of subdivision in the Gebiet.
Another method through which the subdivision of land may be
curtailed is through the benefactor leaving a will. This will may
be (and is more often today than in the past) a written document,
or it may simply be a verbal indication by the person concerned as
to how he or she wishes the estate to be divided. Very
occasionally a potential heir may be disinherited because of
something that he or she has done during the life of the parent,
or another heir may be left more than his or her rightful portion
(that is, according to the customary rules of devolution) of the
estate as a reward for some service rendered to the parent. Where
this happens, the favoured heir is often the youngest child, who
has cared for the aged parent in the last years of his or her
life. However, by far the most common departure from custom that
a will may contain is a discrimination between heirs on the
grounds of sex. The benefactor may specify that moveable assets
in the estate must be given to his or her daughters, and the land
to the sons. Such a will simply anticipates a strategy which may,
in any case, have been adopted by the heirs.
Another means through which the subdivision of land may be
avoided, or its rate reduced, is through marriage strategies.
Three types of marriage may contribute to the maintenance of
viable farming units. The first of these is cousin marriage. In
so far as it is an effective strategy for the reconsolidation of
land, it is equally effective whether between cross- or parallel









Figure 2: Cousin Marriage and land Consolidation.
In the example of cousin marriage given in the diagram above, A
leaves a farm to his three children, B, C, and D. When the
children of B and C (E and F) marry, they are able to
reconsolidate Bfs and C's portions of the farm.
Cousin marriage, which was a' common feature of Baster marriage
practices in the past, particularly among the wealthiest and
poorest sections of the population, is less common, but far from
rare today, although it now usually takes the form of marriage to
second cousins, where the significance for the reconsolidation of
land is naturally less great - unless the parents from whom the
couple inherit had no siblings.
A second form of marriage through which consolidation of land may
take place is through sibling group marriage. This is the term
which will be used to describe marriage between two brothers of
one family and two sisters of another, or between a brother and
sister of one family and a brother and sister of another. Once
again, the fact that the rules of inheritance do not discriminate
between males and females means that the sex of the participants
is not of significance.
A ft
c > F
Figure 3: Sibling Group Marriage
In the example given above, C and D each inherit equal shares of
the farm belonging to A. In a similar way E and F inherit
equivalent portions of the farm belonging to their parent B. If C
and F, and D and E marry, the two couples may negotiate the
distribution of land which they have inherited. It is not
uncommon for an exchange of land to take place (perhaps
supplemented with a larger or smaller adjustment in cash or
livestock) which will lead to a reconsolidation of both estates.
In other words, C may agree to exchange his portion of farm A for
E's portion of farm B. This will enable C and F to live on
portions E and F of farm B, while D and E live on portions C and D
of farm A.
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The third kind of marriage which can lead to consolidation of land
holdings is that between neighbours. In such a case the couple
who marry may ensure that the pieces of land which they inherit
are adjacent to one another. They may then remove the fence
between the two farms in order to create a consolidated unit. Or,
more commonly, they will simply install a gate between the two
sections and treat them as camps of one farm. This arrangement
is, in one respect, the converse of informal subdivision, since
the fact of consolidation will not be reflected in the official
records.
A final means through which subdivision may be avoided is through
the sale or leasing of the farm. An example of the selling of
land is given in the case of Bloupoort, described above. Selling
land that would otherwise be subdivided would appear to be the
most logical solution to the problem, but it is one which is
fraught with difficulties. Firstly, there is is the problem of
the availability of a suitable buyer. Since ready cash has always
been in short supply in the Gebiet, and since credit facilities
were very limited (the reasons for which will be discussed below),
heirs may be hard-pressed to find a buyer. In addition, by decree
of the Advisory Council, no one may own more than 14,000 hectares
of land in the Gebiet. (65) But even if one were to be able to
find a buyer with the necessary cash or credit who owned less than
the maximum amount of land, there would still be difficulties.
There is generally an emotional attachment to "family land", and
it is regarded as less than desirable to sell land to non-kin.
This obviously severely limits the number of possible buyers.
Sometimes heirs will arrange amongst themselves to exchange
moveable assets, particularly livestock, for land, but this often
leaves viable areas understocked.
A major difficulty with selling farm land, whether to kin or non-
kin, lies in the paradox that the value per hectare rises as the
size of the land holding falls. While the productive potential of
farmland declines through the process of subdivision, its value as
residential land actually increases, since it becomes a cheap
place on which to stay, and a form of surety against the vagaries
of the future. In Namibia as a whole, very little is provided in
the way of financial security for aged or jobless blacks, and a
plot of land on which to live, virtually free of cost, is
obviously a most desirable asset. The consequent increase in the
unit value of these tiny plots often makes their reconsolidation
into viable farmland economically unfeasible. The owner of a
piece of land of say 50 hectares in extent would not be interested
in selling his land at the prevailing market value of say R3.00
per hectare, but would probably want at least Rl,000 or more for
it, since it would mean having to re-establish his household
somewhere else - either on a school farm, communal farm, or in the
town - and the costs of 'moving and building another dwelling would
certainly exceed the R150 which he would get if he were to be paid
the market value. (66)
A common method of avoiding some of these difficulties is to
simply lease inherited land to a co-heir. Such arrangements are
often both very informal and very complex. Cash transactions are
seldom part of the arrangement: most often they include leaving a
certain amount of stock on the land in the care of the co-heir,
and may sometimes include residence rights for the lessor's
family.
Although the partible system of inheritance is one which
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contradicts sound economic practice, and has undoubtedly
contributed to the decline of the productive capacity of the
Gebiet's farm land, it is a custom which does not differ markedly
from that practised by surrounding white farmers. The reason why
it has detrimental effects in the Baster Gebiet is because of lack
of access to capital which would enable subdivision to be avoided.
Problems of Finance in Rehoboth
The lack of access to capital for the development of farming, as
well as of retail enterprises, was identified by the Du Plessis
Committee as the major cause of economic stagnation in the Baster
Gebiet. This lack of access to capital was primarily due to the
fact that fixed property in the Gebiet could not be acquired by
anyone other than a Baster Burger. This meant that the normal
sources of capital such as commercial banks and finance houses
were generally unwilling to grant loans where fixed property
was offered as security. (67) Even where they did agree to do so,
the effect of the limitation of the disposal of fixed property
(particularly land) was to depress the value of the property which
was offered as security, and hence to reduce the size of the loan.
This was because potential buyers were restricted to the few rich
Basters who, in any case, might already be in possession of the
maximum 14,000 hectares.
The other major source of capital - through State institutions -
was also closed to Baster farmers, at least in the earlier period.
(6 8) The Land Bank of South West Africa, which had been of such
immense importance in establishing white agriculture in the
territory, had never been intended as a source of capital for
"non-white" farmers. Even if it had been, it would never have
granted loans where restrictions existed on the sale of property
used as security.
The authorities had recognized the need for granting aid to Baster
farmers even before the investigation of the Odendaal Commission
and the Du Plessis Committee. In March 1960, for example, the
Administration had lent R20,000 to the Advisory Council so that
farmers in the Gebiet could be granted loans. The rate of
interest which the Administration charged on the loan was 3.5 per
cent, - the same rate that it charged the Land Bank. But whereas
the Land Bank could re-lend the money at 4 per cent because its
clients were generally on a sound financial footing, the Baster
Advisory Council was forced to charge 5 per cent interest in order
to cover itself against possible bad debts. As the Du Plessis
Committee noted, Baster farmers were consequently considerably
disadvantaged, compared to their white counterparts, even when
State assistance was offered. (69)
The Committee recommended that a statutory body be established in
order that finance could be made available for the development of
the Gebiet. (70) The model to be used was that of the Coloured
Development Corporation which had been established in South Africa
six years earlier. (71) REKOR (Rehoboth Beleggings en Ontwikkel-
ingskorporasie) was subsequently established.
The Establishment of REKOR
REKOR came into being on the 27th of June, 1969, with a share
capital of R10,000, all of the shares being held by the South
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African Government. (72) Its establishment was fiercely opposed
by the Baster Advisory Council and by numerous members of the
community. There were many reasons for this opposition. The
Board of Directors of the Corporation was -despite objections by
the Advisory Council - to be composed only of whites because, in
the words of the Minister of Rehoboth Affairs, "persons of
integrity" were required to fill seats on the Board. (73) There
was also opposition to the fact that the Corporation was able to
operate entirely independently of any formal control by the
Advisory Council. It was not even required to consult with the
Council. In fact, its powers actually exceeded those of the
Council which was, at this stage, still a purely advisory body.
The political party which held all of the seats on the Council,
the Volksparty, opposed the establishment of REKOR on the grounds
that it represented a furtherance of the aims of the policy of
Separate Development, (74) but the main reason why the majority of
the members of the community were opposed to the establishment of
the Corporation was because it could grant loans, and could
mortgage the land as security. Even though the Act which had
established REKOR specifically debarred the Corporation from
disposing of any property which it might acquire in the Gebiet to
any person other than a Baster Burger, it was feared that Basters
would lose their land to whites through accepting loans from
REKOR. (75)
Suspicion that the establishment of the Corporation would lead to
the alienation of Baster land gave rise to demonstrations and
protest marches. Telegrams were sent to the British and American
ambassadors, as well as to the United Nations Organization. It
was also demanded of the South African Prime Minister that a
referendum on the desirability of establishing REKOR be held in
the Gebiet. Thousands of booklets containing a message from the
Minister of Rehoboth Affairs, in which he attempted to allay
suspicions that Baster land would be alienated, were publicly
burned. (76)
Despite this opposition, REKOR began its activities in the Gebiet
in August 1969. In its first annual report the Corporation noted
that it was operating in the face of opposition "... from a
certain group of Rehoboth burghers ..." In fact there was a quite
effective boycott of the loans offered. Only 26 applications for
loans were received, of which 21 were granted. (77)
The boycott was fairly short-lived, however, and in the next
financial year 80 applications for loans were received. Of these
59 were granted, while the total amount loaned was increased from
R122,050 to R302,446. By 1974 the Board of Directors could report
that opposition to REKOR was "... gradually giving way to a more
realistic view of the value of the Corporation." (78)
By the end of March, 1983, REKOR had granted loans totalling
R4,700,422, of which R3,375,752 (almost 72 per cent) had been
granted for farming purposes. The table below gives a breakdown
of the purposes for which loans were granted. It is apparent that
most loans were made were for business purposes, followed by the
purchase of livestock and the purchase of land.
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Table 2: Loans Granted by REKOR: August 1969 - March 1983 (79)
Amount Percentage of Percentage of
Purpose Number (in Rands) farming loans total loans
Livestock
Purchases 276 1,265,160 37.5 2 6.9
Land
Purchases 143 1,165,911 34.5 24.8
Fencing 140 446,470 13.2 9.5
Water
Instal-
lations 131 211,208 6.3 4.5
Land
Surveys 151 90,660 2.7 1.9
Other (mainly
discharge of
debts) 72 196,343 5.8 4.2
Business 124 1,324,670 - 28.2
1037 4,700,422 100.0 100.0
Although the initial resistance to REKOR was largely overcome
during the first five years of its existence, numerous criticisms
of the way in which the Corporation operated were expressed during
my fieldwork, and many Baster farmers still avoid taking out loans
from REKOR. A major general complaint was simply that once one
had taken out a loan, one lost control over one's farm. "'n Man
is nie meer baas van sy eie plaas nie" was the common complaint.
One is forced to submit to a variety of directives from the
Corporation about the way in which the farm is stocked and
managed, and many of these instructions, it is claimed, are not
sound farming practices for the region.
The type of camping system, in particular, came in for
considerable condemnation. Baster farmers claimed that it had
been developed in the Orange Free State, and was being implemented
in the Gebiet without due consideration of the differences between
the two regions in respect of veld-types and climatic conditions.
But even if the system was a sound one for the area, there is
doubt that it is actually cost effective because of low stocking
levels. (80)
Many Basters were also highly critical of the Corporation's
policies in respect of the granting of loans for the purchase of
livestock. Such purchases must be made from the experimental farm
at Tsumis, which was established by the Department of Agriculture
on the recommendations of the Du Plessis Committee. (81) It was
said that the quality of livestock sold at Tsumis was markedly
inferior to that owned, and offered for sale, by many of the more
progressive Baster breeders. The auctions held at Tsumis, its
critics claimed, simply served to provide white farmers in the
territory with an opportunity to off-load their inferior and
unwanted animals at inflated prices.
Whatever the truth about the quality of livestock offered at
Tsumis, it does seem that REKOR embarked on a policy of financing
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the purchase of karakul breeding stock at precisely the same time
as the industry was going through a period of great instability.
(82) It also seems as if REKOR bore a major responsibility for
the overstocking of the Gebiet. In the decade following its
establishment in 1969, the Corporation provided Rl,074,360 for the
purchase of livestock, most of which was karakul sheep. (83) By
1979 the ratio between land and small stock units stood at 2.01 Ha
/ ssu. (84) An apparently reliable estimate of the carrying
capacity of the area suggests a ratio of 3.5 Ha / ssu. (85) REKOR
had assisted in raising the Gebiet1s stock-holding to an alarming
174 per cent.
If the Corporation appears to have been eager to finance the
purchase of livestock in excess of the land's capacity, it was
less than vigorous in tackling the problem of the reconsolidation
of land - at least until 1981, when a change in policy seems to
have occurred. Until then it spent only R543,064 on attempting to
combat the problem of subdivision. This represented less than 18
per cent of all money loaned, and less than 22 per cent of finance
made available for agricultural purposes. (The comparative
figures for the purchase of livestock are Rl,160,560 being 38
percent of all loans, and 46.5 percent of farming loans.) (86) At
the time of my fieldwork many Baster farmers expressed the opinion
that the amount of money being made available for reconsolidation
of subdivided land was hopelessly insufficient, a criticism which
seems to be well-founded. Between 1969 and 1983 REKOR granted 143
loans for the purchase of land. (8 7) It is not known how many of
these loans were used to reconsolidate subdivided land, and how
many financed the purchase of land units that were already of an
economically viable size, but figures from a study conducted in
1980 suggest that little success had been achieved.
Table 3: Ownership of Farmland (1980) (88)









It would seem that REKOR took note of these figures, for between
1980 and 1983 it granted 37 loans for land purchases totalling
R662,847. This represented more than 40 percent of all loans
granted, and, more significantly, 75.5 percent of all farming
loans granted in the period. (89)
Another criticism is that REKOR has not been involved in any form
of development other than assisting farmers and retailers in the
Gebiet. No mines have been established, although this is
supposedly one of the aims of the Corporation expressed in the
preamble of the Act by which it was formed, nor has a single
factory been built with its assistance, despite the fact that
at least one-third of the adult population of the Gebiet is
temporarily or permanently outside of its borders because of the















The most persistent criticism of the financial policies of the
Corporation, however, is that it helps only those who are wealthy
to start with: increasing their wealth, while doing nothing to
assist the poorer farmers. This contrasts with the leasing system
of the earlier period, which does not seem to have contributed
markedly to the development of class distinctions in the
community. A few wealthier Baster farmers may have been able to
put the incomes which were generated through leasing to some
productive use, but, as we have seen, this was not the norm. The
contrast with REKOR is striking. Despite the fact that the
manifest purpose for the establishment of the Corporation was to
generate development of the Baster community "on its own lines",
the capitalization of Gebiet agriculture has undoubtedly
stimulated economic stratification in a form that was not inherent
in the community before REKOR was established.
Money (other than for land purchases) is granted only to farmers
who already own an economic unit. In other words, the R3,3 75,752
allocated to farmers between 1969 and 1983 has been lavished on
only a very few individuals. In 1968 there were 105 farmers with
economic units out of a total of 2,244 landowners. (91) Even
presuming, firstly, that all of the 143 loans granted by REKOR
between 1969 and 1983 for the purchase of land created new owners
of economic units (although the evidence suggests that this is not
the case) and secondly, that the total number of land owners did
not increase between 1968 and 1983 (which seems most unlikely),
the Corporation had, by that stage, assisted just over 11 per cent
of all the landowners in the Gebiet.
In addition to being accused of bias in favour of the wealthier
members of the community, the Corporation is also commonly charged
with being politically partisan. It is claimed that its loans are
used to buy political support for the South African Government's
policies, and that only those who supported the Bastervereeniging
political party were likely to be granted loans by the
Corporation. In the by-elections of 1975, the Corporation's
employees were accused of having tried to influence Baster farmers
who were applying for loans to support this "moderate" party,
rather than the more "radical" Volksparty. (92)
Whatever truth there was in this allegation of direct interference
on the part of REKOR officials in the political affairs of the
Gebiet, there is little doubt that the activities of the
Corporation have had certain indirect political effects inside the
community. Only those who are not implacably opposed to the
policy of Separate Development apply for, and are granted, the
loans which the Corporation offers. Consequently, support for the
South African Government's policies and the provision of financial
aid have come to be equated. In addition, assistance is granted
to those who are already wealthy in the eyes of the community, and
hence to those who tend to have political influence.
The disseminating of this political influence happens largely
through the patron-client relationships which are a typical
feature in Baster politics. When the Corporation grants loans
to wealthy - and Goverment-supporting - Baster farmers, support
for the State is ensured from a much larger group of Baster voters
as well. These clients may simply be poor families who live as
bywoners on the rich landowner's farm. The scale of the patron-
client system is far greater, however, on the so-called school
farms.
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On such farms schools were established by wealthy landowners
- ostensibly for the convenience of farmers in the surrounding
areas, but also, very often, to enable the landowner to further
his political ambitions. A rough classroom was erected, the
services of a teacher secured, and parents of children of school-
going age would be permitted to build small houses on the farm,
and reside there in order that their children could attend the
school. Apart from schooling, the benefits derived by the
residents included being able to live rent-free, and entitlement
to free water, firewood, and such grazing as was required for
stock for their immediate household needs. In return, their main
formal obligation, in the past, was to contribute to the salary of
the teacher, and to render assistance to the farm owner if
required. They also gave electoral support to the farm owner if
he sought political office on the Council.
Although, today, the nature of these reciprocal benefits has
changed, the school farm system continues to ensure political
support by the residents for the farm owner. The teachers are
paid by the state, and the absence of most able-bodied men means
that the amount of labour rendered to the farm owner is
insignificant, but the clients' political obligations, although
less direct, are still important. A party system has developed in
the Gebiet, and the parties compete to gain control of the school
farms through the owners and other notables. A common pattern is
for one or other party to establish a branch on the farm, and for
the owner to be elected as chairman of the party branch, with the
principal of the school as the secretary, and perhaps a teacher or
shopkeeper as the treasurer.
If the farm owner is the recipient of a REKOR loan, positive
attitudes towards the policies of the South African Government can
be easily and effectively disseminated through such a patron-
client system. Support for REKOR is quickly and easily
transformed into support for the Bastervereeniging, at the expense
of the Volksparty. Antagonistic attitudes towards REKOR have thus
served to provide a focus for political conflicts between the
contending parties in the Gebiet.
In attempting to promote the development of agriculture of a
particular type in the Gebiet, the policies of REKOR have had
profound consequences for the pattern of class formation and
political competition in the community - consequences which the
leasing system did not have. The Corporation's activities have
served to strengthen patron-client relationships, since it has
provided ready support for the wealthy landowners who act as
patrons in the community. At the same time, it has done nothing
to lessen the dependence of the clients, and so has heightened the
contradictions between the classes through favouritism towards
those few whose future lies in the development of the ranching
potential of the Gebiet, while simultanously antagonizing those
Burgers who have no hope in sharing in the economic benefits of
its development.
The inheritance system, on the other hand, tends to have a
countervailing tendency. Subdivision breaks down large
landholdings into small ones, whether the owners are rich or poor.
It also has direct political effects, since it can make patrons
less able to dispense favours to their clients, and consequently
less able to generate political support.
The results of this process are most striking on school farms
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which have been subdivided. Very often the customary rights to
firewood and grazing are curtailed when the farm is parcelled out
to the heirs, because the resources available to the (usually
unfortunate) individual who retains the section of the farm on
which the school settlement is located are barely adequate to
provide for his or her own needs.
On one school farm which has been divided into portions which are
significantly smaller than viable economic units the heir to the
piece of land on which the school settlement is located has even
initiated steps to have the area declared a village in order that
he can sell, or lease, residential plots to the parents of
children attending the school.
The termination of patron-client relationships in this way leads
to greater political freedom. To an increasing extent the
previous uniformity in political support by residents of school
farms is giving way, as they are subdivided, to greater diversity,
and it is now not uncommon for all political parties to have
branches on such farms.
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